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Abstract 
Major emergencies are high-stakes, ambiguous, dynamic and stressful events. Emergency 
response commanders rely on their expertise and training to mitigate these factors and 
implement action. The Critical Decision Method was used to interview n=31 commanders 
from the Police (n=12), Fire and Rescue (n=15) and Ambulance Services (n=4) in the UK 
about challenges to decision making. Transcripts were analysed in two ways: (i) using 
thematic analyses to categorise the challenges to incident command; and (ii) grounded theory 
to develop a theoretical understanding of how challenges influenced decision processing. 
There were nine core challenges to incident command, themed into two categories: (i) those 
relating to the perceived characteristics of the incident itself; and (ii) those relating to 
uncertainties about (inter)personal dynamics of the team(s) responding. Consideration of 
challenges featured prominently in decision makers’ prospective modelling, especially when 
thinking about goal accomplishment (i.e., ‘What if I deploy now? What if I don’t?’). 
Commanders were motivated to ‘save life’ (attack/approach goal), yet also sought to ‘prevent 
harm’ (defend/avoid goal). Challenges led commanders to redundantly deliberate about what 
to do; their prospective modelling was related to the anticipation of potential negative 
consequences that might arise both for acting (attack) and not acting (defend). Commanders 
identified this difficult trade-off, yet described how experience and their ‘responsibility as a 
commander’ gave them confidence to overcome decision inertia. Future research is needed to 
identify whether decision making training on how to anticipate and overcome difficult 
cognitive trade-offs would lead to more flexible and expedient commanding.
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Redundant Deliberation about Negative Consequences: Decision Inertia in Emergency 
Responders  
                                                          
1 AUTHOR NOTE: The data presented in this manuscript has been previously disseminated as 
part of a PhD thesis, which is stored by the library at the University of Liverpool, UK. It has 
also been described in a non-academic practitioner report of the research, which was 
provided as a thank you to practitioners who were involved in the research and is available 
to download on ResearchGate. 
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The Police, Fire and Rescue, and Ambulance Services are responsible for responding to a 
wide variety of emergency incidents. These range from relatively low-impact incidents (e.g. 
trips and falls, shop lifting) to large-scale major disasters (e.g. earthquakes, terrorist attacks). 
Major disasters are characterised by unknown and ambiguous information (Bharosa, Lee & 
Janssen, 2010), involve high risk, high-stakes and time pressure (Chen, Sharman, Rao & 
Upadhyaya, 2008) and often cause cognitive overload and stress to the responders involved 
(Paton & Flin, 1999). The need for joint coordination between the response agencies, who 
each have independent roles, responsibilities and operational objectives, has increased as 
research has recognised the importance of collaborative disaster response (Janssen, Lee, 
Bharosa & Creswell, 2010). Yet, so-called ‘interoperability’ adds complexity to the 
emergency because it can blur professional boundaries (Brown, Crawford & Darongkamas, 
2000) and increase confusion about roles and responsibilities within the networked team 
(Curnin, Owen, Paton & Brooks, 2015). Taken collectively, major emergency incidents are 
extreme environments that place demands on the physical, psychological and interpersonal 
skills of the decision maker (Orasanu & Lieberman, 2011), creating difficulties for 
performance. Psychological research can help to identify these demands and offer solutions 
to mitigate them.  
In extension of previous research, this paper has two goals: (i) to identify and extend 
knowledge on the core challenges to emergency responding via the retrospective interviewing 
of expert emergency commanders in the UK; and (ii) to explore how these challenges 
influence decision making with regards to prospective modelling and goal accomplishment. 
A number of studies have taken a broad-brush approach to identify the challenges to 
emergency responding. Salmon, Stanton, Jenkins and Walker (2011) explored the multi-
agency response to a training exercise of a widespread flooding disaster, involving the 
emergency services, the military and local/civilian authorities. They identified seven barriers 
to coordination, including organisational problems (i.e., ambiguous command structure), poor 
information management, inefficient communications, inadequate situation awareness, 
insufficient equipment, poor understanding of cultural differences, and limited inter-agency 
training exposure. Similarly, Chen et al. (2008) identified how uncertainty, time pressure, 
casualty risk, resource shortages, large-scale damage, infrastructure disruption, multiple 
authorities, conflicts of interest and the demand for timely information can impede 
emergency responding. Taking a more reflective approach by reviewing post-mortem reports 
from large-scale disasters, Boin and ‘t Hart (2010) identified six ‘avoidable pathologies’ to 
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disaster response, related to bad planning, an obsession with full information, communication 
breakdowns, overreliance on command and control, underestimating the usefulness of the 
media, and a lack of concern for post-incident consequences. This paper goes beyond these 
studies by using a novel methodology to explore the real-world and (inter)personal issues 
related to incident commanding, which are difficult to replicate in simulated or training 
environments where the long-term, real-life consequences of behaviour are significantly 
reduced. This paper also explores how challenges influence perceived uncertainty and 
decision processing. Major incidents are inherently ambiguous and complex; it is the 
associated experience of uncertainty that makes decision making difficult. 
Decision inertia is a maladaptive cognitive processing pattern that has been used to 
explain why decisions can derail during emergencies (Alison, Power, van den Heuvel, 
Humann, Palasinksi & Crego, 2015). It describes how action derails, not by choice deferral or 
disengagement with decision processing, but as a result of continued cognitive processing 
and redundant deliberation over the problem. The decision maker is motivated to take action, 
yet the situation is so ambiguous and complex that they struggle to process the situation and 
redundantly deliberate about their choice instead. It seems that decision inertia occurs when 
the decision maker does not have the luxury of avoiding their choice. Indeed, the purpose of 
the emergency commander is to take control of the emergency and so they cannot simply 
avoid or defer their choice. Decision making derails as commanders fail to commit to a 
choice as they continue to reassess the situation, goals, options and anticipated consequences, 
fundamentally failing to take any action at all. 
Decision inertia is more likely when goals are lacking or ambiguous. During a simulated 
training exercise of a large aeroplane crash over a major city, decision inertia occurred when 
there were unclear goals, multiple teams involved and no set deadline for a decision (Alison 
et al., 2015); rather than coordinate efforts and work at the multi-team level, decision makers 
redundantly sought within-agency information. Goals are defined as an individuals’ desired 
end-point, which motivate and direct behaviour towards purposeful outcomes (Locke & 
Latham, 1990). It is important that goals are concrete (‘achieve X’) rather than abstract (‘do 
your best’) (Locke & Latham, 2002) and that individuals have clear ‘implementation 
intentions’ that provide knowledge on how to achieve one’s goal under different 
circumstances (e.g. ‘If Y happens, do X’) (Gollwitzer, 1993; 1999). In emergency contexts, 
goals can be themed into two categories: ‘attack’ goals that focus on achieving positive 
outcomes (e.g. ‘treat casualties’) and ‘defend’ goals that focus on avoiding negative 
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consequences (e.g. ‘prevent harm to responders’) (Power & Alison, in press), with different 
agencies prioritising different goals depending upon their roles and responsibilities (e.g. 
ambulance tend to prioritise ‘attack’ goals due to their role to ‘treat casualties’). Power and 
Alison (in press) likened this attack-defend trade-off in emergency contexts to the goal trade-
off outlined by the approach-avoid model of general behaviour. At the behavioural level, 
approach motivation is associated with the experience of positive emotions that induce 
movement towards a stimulus, whereas avoidance is linked to the movement away from a 
stimulus due to the experience of negative emotions (Carver & White, 1994). At the goal 
setting level, approach goals reflect the desire to achieve positive outcomes, whereas avoid 
goals are associated with the avoidance of negative outcomes (Bossuyt, Moors & DeHouwer, 
2014; Elliot, 2006; Elliot, Eder & Harmon-Jones, 2013). Power and Alison (in press) 
suggested that ‘attack’ goals in emergency contexts were linked to approach motivation, 
whereas ‘defend’ goals were linked to avoid motivation. These ‘cognitive trade-offs’, which 
move beyond the trade-off of goals to also include the trade-off off options and task 
demands, are important to study in the context of emergencies as commanders are frequently 
faced with multiple competing goals, options and task demands that dynamically shift during 
the course of the incident. 
Present Study. The majority of research exploring emergency decision making has 
focussed on catastrophic disasters, acknowledging that although they may be rare, they can 
lead to cataclysmic consequences that can far outlast the incident, making them noteworthy 
of research (Boin & ‘t Hart, 2010). Yet, their rarity and the difficulty for researchers to 
collect data from such events makes them difficult to study; instead researchers have relied 
upon training exercises and simulations (e.g. Alison, et al., 2015; Bharosa, et al., 2010; 
Salmon, et al., 2011). Although data from training events can contribute to an understanding 
of general challenges to incident responding, there is less scope for insight into the real-world 
subjective experience of responders. Even when simulations are incredibly immersive (e.g. 
Alison, van den Heuvel, Waring, Power, Long, O’Hara & Crego, 2013) responders are aware 
that the exercise is fictitious and so the personal impact of such events, especially with regard 
to the salience of potential aversive long-term consequences (e.g. job loss), will be reduced.  
We sought to address this gap by adopting a methodology that would allow us to not only 
facilitate the exploration of general challenges to incident responding, but to also unpack the 
experiential and (inter)personal challenges associated with emergency responding in the real-
world. We used retrospective interviewing with experienced commanders about the core 
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challenges to incident command across a broad spectrum of incidents. Although the interview 
questions were designed to incorporate some of the challenges identified by previous 
literature, our use of prompts was semi-structured and exploratory. This meant that we 
mainly used prompts in response to topics that were identified by the interviewee, rather than 
using them as structured questions to lead the interview. We were especially interested in 
incidents that commanders identified as being challenging themselves, rather than asking 
them to only consider large-scale incidents, which in reality may be perceived as less 
challenging due to the large amount of pre-designed policy that is already in place for such 
emergencies. This meant that we were not necessarily focussing on ‘once in a lifetime’ type 
incidents, but on any incident that the responder perceived to be challenging themselves, no 
matter what the scale. However, as our sample consisted of commanders only, we were 
specifically focussed on the challenges to command rather than everyday responding. There 
were two core research questions: 
 Research Question 1 (RQ1): What are the main thematic challenges to emergency 
commanding? 
 Research Question 2 (RQ2): How do the challenges associated with commanding 




A total of n=31 commanders from the UK Police (n=12), Fire and Rescue (n=15) and 
Ambulance Services (n=4) participated in this study. Participants were from the North West 
region of England and were recruited via email. Sampling was opportunistic as emails were 
sent using work emails, which were disseminated via contacts within each organisation, and 
commanders asked to contact the authors if they wished to participate in the study. 
Participants were mainly male (n=30) and age ranged from 37 to 54 years (M= 44 years). All 
participants were qualified at ‘tactical’ command level (with many qualified at ‘strategic’ 
level), meaning that they were experienced at being in charge of emergency incidents and 
senior to the ‘operational’ command level. They each had a minimum of 15 years’ experience 
and a mean length of service of 24 years. As such, despite the (relatively) small sample size, 
their expertise and collective breadth of experience included hundreds, if not thousands, of 
incidents.  
Tables and Figures 
Data Collection 
Data was collected using qualitative, semi-structured interviews to facilitate the 
discovery of new conceptual and theoretical knowledge about the challenges to incident 
command (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). The ‘Critical Decision Method’ (CDM) 
interview technique was used (Table 1), which has been used to identify the goal structures, 
knowledge requirements and expertise used by experts who operate in challenging work 
domains (Wong, 2003). This method has been utilised regularly by researchers who seek to 
generate an understanding of ‘real-world’ psychology (Crandall, Klein & Hoffman, 2006; 
Klein & Militello, 2004). The interview probes were mainly based upon those that have been 
previously used in CDM interview protocols (e.g. Crandall, et al., 2006) and extended to 
incorporate challenges to emergency decision making that were identified in the literature 
(e.g. trust issues, information complexity, etc.). Prompts were used to probe the interviewee, 
and so their use varied between participants depending upon what the participant chose to 
discuss. As such, prompts were used to unpack the issues that were identified by the 
participant, rather than to lead the participant to discuss specific issues. This meant that the 
quantification of themes was not appropriate; just because a participant didn’t identify a 
perceived challenge during their recall doesn’t mean that it is not a pervasive issue more 
generally. We thus provide a purely qualitative interpretation of these themes. 
We interviewed experienced commanders (as opposed to novices) as ‘expert 
interviewees’ are better able to provide rich real-world descriptions about novel or under-
researched topics, such as incident command challenges (Bogner & Menz, 2009). Experts 
don’t only possess the knowledge required to operate in their work domain, but they are also 
able to describe this knowledge in an analytic and reflective way (Klein & Militello, 2004). A 
key requirement of CDM interviewing is that researchers are familiar with the organisational 
context (e.g. terminology, work processes) (Crandall, et al., 2006), having ‘quasi-expert’ 
status (Pfadenhauer, 2009). Not only does this help with data interpretation but it also 
facilitates data collection as the participant can communicate in an organisationally-informed, 
yet non-competitive, environment (Trinczek, 2009). The researcher who conducted these 
interviews spent twelve months prior to data collection immersing themselves in the work 
environment of the emergency services, reading policy documents, attending training events 
and establishing a working relationship with each organisation. 
Procedure 
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The majority of interviews (n=29) were conducted at the participant’s place of work, 
with the remaining two taking place at a University. All interviews were conducted in a quiet 
location, with three people present: the participant and two researchers. The primary 
researcher led the interview and the second interviewer took notes to help with transcription 
and asking additional questions based on their notes. The CDM interview protocol involves 
four ‘sweeps’ for information: (i) incident identification (selecting a relevant incident); (ii) 
timeline verification (establishing the timeline for what happened); (iii) deepening probes 
(key questions about the cognitive processes used during the incident); and (iv) ‘what if?’ 
probes (hypothetical questions about, for example, what a ‘novice’ would do differently) 
(Crandall et al., 2006). Participants were asked to identify a ‘difficult decision’ that they had 
made in the past, where the incident was ‘especially challenging’ with ‘high consequences’ 
that would be ‘very difficult to reverse’. These boundaries were used to identify an incident 
that challenged the participants’ capacity to command, as opposed to general operational 
responding. Interviews ranged from 58 to 155 minutes in length, with a mean length of 99 
minutes. 
Data Analyses 
Interviews were recorded on a Dictaphone and anonymously transcribed by the primary 
researcher with all identifiable details (e.g. names, locations) removed. Preliminary analyses 
were conducted immediately following each interview, where the primary and secondary 
interviewers discussed and reviewed the notes that were taken during the interview. This was 
to develop an early understanding of the types of ‘challenges’ identified by participants. 
Analyses continued during interview transcription by keeping notes on the key themes that 
emerged during transcription. The general process of qualitative analyses of text (i.e., 
transcripts) involves four stages: (i) initial reading of transcripts; (ii) early coding of 
transcripts; (iii) refinement of codes (possibly into higher order ‘themes’); and (iv) creation of 
a theoretical argument that links codes and themes together (Liamputtong, 2009). Generally, 
coding is inductive, whereby the researcher derives codes from the ‘bottom-up’ analyses of 
the text, or deductive, whereby the text is coded in a ‘top-down’ manner in line with prior 
theories or coding dictionaries (Braun & Clarke, 2006). It is important that researchers self-
monitor their progress during analyses to ensure that their conclusions remain grounded in 
the data (Mueser and Nagel, 2009). They should also remain flexible during coding so that 
they can adapt to novel findings (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Liamputtong, 2009). 
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Both ‘grounded theory’ and ‘thematic’ analyses are similar techniques that combine 
inductive and deductive processes. The main difference is that grounded theory seeks to 
generate a theoretical model from the data that can be generalised to wider psychological 
phenomena (Glaser & Strauss, 1965; Lo, 2014), whereas thematic analyses seek to provide a 
rich and detailed description of the data set that is being studied (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Recent advances in qualitative methodologies have suggested that pluralistic qualitative 
analysis, whereby the same data set is analysed using different qualitative techniques, can 
help to enrich our understanding and produce multi-layered and multi-dimensional 
conclusions (Frost & Nolas, 2011). As we sought to explore the data fully, to develop an 
understanding of both challenges and how they influence decision processing, a pluralistic 
approach was adopted by conducting both thematic and grounded theory analyses.  
RQ1. Thematic analyses were conducted to identify the perceived challenges to 
emergency commanding. This involved six phases: (i) familiarisation with the data through 
transcription and re-reading of the text; (ii) generation of initial codes across the data set; (iii) 
collation of codes into themes and patterns; (iv) revision of themes and refinement of 
categories; (v) definition and naming of themes; and (vi) production of a detailed report of 
analyses (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Importantly, the authors did not quantify these themes. The 
reasons for this are threefold: firstly, the aim of the research was to identify and explore 
challenges to decision making, rather than test their prevalence; secondly, to achieve this 
exploratory research aim, the interview style was semi-structured, meaning that not all 
participants were asked the same questions as prompts were used to probe discussion rather 
than lead it (i.e., just because the participant didn’t perceive ‘trust’ as an issue in their chosen 
incident, it does not mean that they don’t perceive it as a pervasive challenge more 
generally); and thirdly, due to points one and two, the authors were concerned that the 
generation of quantified percentages for themes could be potentially misleading. We do, 
however, believe that the identified themes could be used to guide future quantitative 
research that asks commanders about the prevalence of challenges, possible across different 
emergency contexts and with comparison to individual differences in decision making styles.  
RQ2. The second aim of this research was to develop a theoretical explanation of how 
challenges influenced cognitive processing and decision making during incident command. 
Grounded theory analyses were performed (Glaser & Strauss, 1965). This involved initial 
inductive coding of the data, with a view to explain how challenges seemed to interacted with 
cognitive processing. This was followed by further refinement and deductive coding of the 
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data, based upon the original themes that emerged during inductive coding. This process of 
refinement and further coding continued until ‘theoretical saturation’ was reached; a point 
during analyses where no more conceptual insight can be derived from the data and a 
theoretical model is developed (Bloor & Wood, 2006). Analyses were conducted by the 
primary researcher, who discussed coding with the second coder to reach mutual agreement 
and consensus.  
Results 
RQ1: A thematic analysis of the main challenges to emergency incident command 
There were nine types of ‘challenging incident’ that were discussed by commanders. 
These were: public protests and rioting (n=5); large urban search and rescue disasters (e.g. 
building collapse; train derailments) (n=5); firearms and hostage negotiation incidents (n=4); 
gas/chemical leaks (n=4); large fires (n=3); multi-vehicle road traffic collisions (n=3); crowd 
management and crushing (n=3); terrorism (n=2); and flooding (n=2). Interviews were 
thematically analysed to identify the challenges to incident command. Nine challenges were 
identified and grouped under two thematic headings: (i) endogenous uncertainties (the 
perceived uncontrollable characteristics of the emergency incident); and (ii) exogenous 
uncertainties (the characteristics of the operating system (i.e., team) responding to the 
incident) (Alison, Power, van den Heuvel & Waring, 2015). Details of thematic categories 
and associated quotations are provided in Table 2. A visual depiction of themes is displayed 
in Figure 1. 
Endogenous challenges to commanding 
Information issues. Commanders described how unavailable or unknown information 
limited their ability to command the emergency. Lack of information was a key inhibitor to 
decision making as it was associated with uncertainty and increased deliberation: “what we 
live and breathe on in this organisation is information and intelligence and without 
information we can’t make a decision” (P4). Lack of information was particularly 
problematic for commanders who were remote to the incident and had to rely on information 
provided by others. This was especially challenging for Fire Service commanders, who rely 
heavily on visual information to perform their role. Decision making was also challenged 
when there was too much information. When information was rich, dynamic and rapidly 
changing, commanders struggled to keep pace with the situation as they were unsure which 
Tables and Figures 
pieces of information were most relevant. Information overload caused difficulties between 
attending to new information and focusing on current tasks. Commanders did however 
express an awareness of information overload and took steps to dilute information processing 
demands across their team, such as limiting their ‘spans of control’ by only creating a 
communication chain that limits the amount of people that any one individual is expected to 
communicate with: “I could’ve potentially could’ve left the whole job with the group 
manager but it would’ve been right on the limits of spans of control” (F15). 
Resource issues. Resources (e.g. staff, equipment) caused issues for commanding when 
they were needed but unavailable. This was especially problematic when incidents were 
novel or extreme and so required specialist assets or expert knowledge that would take time 
to arrive and may be in operation elsewhere: “maybe a difficult part of that was to ensure 
that we had the appropriate level of resources and also the appropriate level of trained 
resources” (A2). When resources were made available, they could also contribute to 
uncertainty if their reliability was questionable. Commanders expressed cynicism over the 
technological capacity of seemingly basic tools such as mobile phones as they often failed to 
work in remote locations. This caused issues for commanders when they incorporated the use 
of resources into strategic plans, but they failed to work effectively.  
Time management issues. Respondents described difficulty in the ability to estimate the 
passage of time during incidents, suggesting that it subjectively passed more quickly than in 
reality. This led to increased feelings of perceived time pressure, which seemed to exacerbate 
anxiety over other endogenous challenges such as the coordination and availability of 
resources. Perceived time pressure was also associated with feelings of helplessness as 
commanders feared that the rapidity of changes on the incident ground exceeded the time it 
took for them to make decisions and coordinate action: 
“when it’s going wrong there’s a certain period where you are helpless. You are helpless 
and whatever is going to be is going to be because you can’t catch it up quickly enough. 
What I mean by that is by the time you’ve made a decision about something the 
circumstances have changed. So by the time you say well actually right let’s try and put a 
cordon on them there. You try and get that out to the operational or bronze commander or 
via your own radio and it’s too late. Something else has happened somewhere else” (P3). 
Commanders described how administrative demands to complete paperwork also increased 
time pressure. They described frustration at having to document their actions whilst juggling 
the demands of the ongoing incident. Interestingly, Police commanders were less critical of 
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the need to complete paperwork and seemed to gain confidence from it, however Ambulance 
and Fire commanders described how the need to complete logs in real-time was impractical 
for their role. 
People management issues. Uncertainty was also attributed to the behaviour of the 
general public during emergencies. The initial stages of an incident were associated with 
concerns about the numbers of public inside the risk area whilst also protecting the public 
outside the risk area. This issue was especially challenging for the Police whose role requires 
them to protect the public inside the risk area whilst also protecting those outside the area via 
cordon management. Police were uniquely challenged in dealing with members of the public 
who were actively hostile towards them: “it was the unknown and we didn’t know what type 
of hostility we were faced with” (P1). This created additional uncertainty as they were 
cognisant of the potential for negative reactions of the public to their actions, which could 
have long-term consequences for their relationship with the public. Commanders also 
described challenges managing social media. They expressed anxiety about feeling exposed 
and how it could lead to wider pubic criticism. Positively, commanders acknowledged that 
the media could facilitate information gathering and the distribution of public information. 
However, they also described misinformation via the media, which could make the situation 
worse. Interestingly, when commanders discussed the negative impact of the media, they 
tended to describe it vicariously by referencing famous media stories: “you know you look at 
Hillsborough – it’s left a sort of mark for 25 years hasn’t it? It hasn’t ended. It’s still going 
on. You know Dunblaine. You can think of all of those things – there’s always a legacy” (F1). 
Anxiety about the media seemed more closely related to previous events than the ongoing 
incident dynamics. 
Budget Cuts and Austerity. A final endogenous challenge that emerged from the data 
was the negative impact of government budget cuts. Budget cuts were associated with 
feelings of pressure due to reduced capacity and increased demands. Commanders felt 
pressure to resolve incidents as quickly as possible in order to free up resources. They 
described how organisational streamlining had limited their ability to ‘go the extra yard’ with 
the public as responders were needed elsewhere: “so it’s about ‘where do you draw the line?’ 
And like whereas we’d always go the extra yard and I think in some cases we still do – but I 
think eventually you’ll go ‘well now that’s not, we’ve done our bit now and we’ll have to 
push it back” (F1). Commanders also described emotional demands such as their concern for 
the welfare of team members with regards to overworking and burnout. Commanders 
expressed anxiety about the capacity of the emergency services to cope in the future. Budget 
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cuts and austerity measures not only affected processing at the incident ground, but 
contributed to general feelings of fear for the future. 
Exogenous challenges to emergency incident commanding 
Communication issues. Communication issues were a prevalent source of uncertainty at 
emergencies: “that’ll come time and time again communications is the biggest bug bear. We 
never ever seem to get it right” (F5). Commanders described how insufficient updating from 
other team members led to significant delays in decision making. This occurred at intra-team 
levels, when crews failed to communicate relevant information to their own commander, and 
also at inter-team levels when other agency representatives were unavailable. This was 
especially problematic when coordinating with non-blue lights agencies due to differences in 
working and organisational cultures meaning that others were often unavailable or did not 
pass on the right information, leading to feelings of frustration. When information was 
shared, there were also challenges associated with miscommunication as a result of 
confusing, ambiguous or contradictory messages. Miscommunication arose both when 
receiving messages and also when delivering messages to team members. Generally, poor 
communication of task relevant information induced uncertainty in the team network, 
creating inaccurate and conflicting assumptions that delayed action. This was exacerbated at 
the multi-team level due to differences in organisational language and terminology. 
Poor role understanding. A poor understanding of one another’s roles was problematic 
for the command team as a whole. Commanders felt that external agencies were often 
unaware of their their capabilities, meaning that opportunities to coordinate skills and 
expertise were missed: “the level of understanding around capability needs to improve. 
Capability awareness is a big one” (F2). Poor role understanding not only led to a lack of 
knowledge of potential opportunities for collaboration, but was also linked to unrealistic 
expectations from other agencies about what could be reasonably achieved. A lack of 
collective role understanding was associated with poor coordination with agencies who then 
focussed on agency-specific tasks, risking duplication and contradictory efforts. Decision 
making was also derailed when other agencies were perceived to lack an understanding of 
their own internal agency role. Poor own role understanding was associated with the 
avoidance of responsibilities. For example, it was often (wrongly) assumed that the police 
would take responsibility at all incidents and so other agencies, especially non-blue light, 
deferred their responsibilities to the police, which frustrated police commanders. 
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Trust issues. Commanders described how distrust might arise if they lacked faith in the 
abilities of other team members to perform a given role. Distrust arose due to either having 
not previously worked with a team member or when they’d had a previous negative 
encounter with that individual. Interestingly, distrust in others did not derail decision making 
as commanders knew not to rely upon those individuals. They acknowledged the poor 
suitability of the individual for the role and tried to assign them to a different responsibility: 
“there’s a difference between trusting an individual and the expectation that that person at 
that level will be able to do what I’m asking of them” (F15). Instead, decision making was 
derailed by ‘trust uncertainty’ as commanders were distracted by questions about the 
reliability of others rather than focussing on the emergency incident. Trust uncertainty led to 
suspicion of potential ulterior motives and fear of being held to account for the poor actions 
of others at both intra- and inter-agency levels. There also seemed to be a ‘trust paradox’ 
effect, whereby too much trust in another led to rigidity. Commanders were wary of over-
familiarisation and feared that their command decisions could be biased by the opinions of 
trusted others. They found it difficult to make decisions when they disagreed with advice 
from trusted others, increasing doubt in one’s own judgement. Commanders tried to avoid 
decisions that could cause interpersonal issues with trusted others and expressed concern that 
less experienced commanders might especially struggle when they are unwilling to break 
trusted friendships. 
Competition. Inter-agency competition was linked to competition between commanders 
to take primacy at an incident. Respondents described how competitive personalities caused 
difficulties for decision making when working with dominant egos who were unwilling to 
share authority: “all very you know power based and lots of boys with their toys and not 
handing over when they should be handing over. And I get really frustrated” (A4). 
Competition was exacerbated by a lack of procedural guidance about inter-organisational 
structure as each agency brings its own, sometimes conflicting, expertise. Interestingly, inter-
agency competition was exacerbated by budget cuts, as agencies fought to justify their own 
worth by stepping outside the remit of their role. Intra-agency competition also derailed 
choice when commanders felt pressure from their superiors to hand over control of an 
incident. Interestingly, intra-agency competition arose when commanders felt the need to 
curtail the efforts of overly enthusiastic and more novice team members. Although 
commanders acknowledged that a proactive approach was useful, they described how it was 
their responsibility as a commander to moderate the actions of emergency workers to protect 
their safety, however this might lead to poor intra-team relations. 
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RQ2: How do the challenges associated with incident command influence decision 
making and behaviour? 
Grounded theory analyses suggested that the challenges identified by RQ1 contributed to 
decision inertia. Commanders described two core goals to emergency responding: approach 
‘save life’ goals to attack the situation and make a positive impact on the emergency and 
avoid ‘prevent harm’ goals to defend the situation and avoid causing further harm. They 
wanted to take action to make the situation better (‘save life’), but equally sought to avoid 
making the situation worse (‘prevent harm’). The consideration of challenges in the decision 
environment was associated with prospective modelling about the potential negative 
outcomes that might violate these goals (e.g. What if I act too quickly when I don’t have 
enough information? What if I act too slowly by waiting for information and the situation 
gets even worse?). Rather than commit to a choice, commanders redundantly deliberated over 
their choice as they anticipated negative consequences for both taking action and not taking 
action. This delayed choice as they tried to avoid negative consequences through redundant 
reassessment of the situation, their goals and potential options. Anticipated negative 
consequences were temporally anchored to either the short- or long-term. Short-term negative 
consequences included: (i) harm to emergency responders; (ii) escalating risk to the citizens 
inside the risk area; and (iii) further disruption to normality. Long-term consequences 
included negative consequences for: (i) oneself; (ii) the team; and (iii) the organisation.  
The ‘save life’ goal. ‘Save life’ is a well cited goal during emergencies: “You must look 
at what we do and why we do it and that’s to save life” (F9).  The goal to ‘save life’ was 
coded as an ‘approach/attack’ goal as it was associated with the desire to take positive action: 
“if I can do something to control and reduce the risk as much as I can to enable me to do that 
then I will do” (F14). This approach oriented goal was driven by feelings of time urgency 
and the desire to take fast action: “I’ve got to make the decision now. I’m going to do 
something now” (P9), in order to rapidly save or preserve the lives of the public: “you get a 
mass number of casualties in a short space of time if you don’t get treatment to them” (A1). 
However, although all three agencies acknowledged ‘save life’ as a primary goal, they were 
often unclear about how to translate this goal into action, referring to ‘save life’ in a 
redundant, rote repetitive, and at times even cynical, manner: “it’s like your objectives of 
what you’re trying to do – save life and blah blah blah” (A4); “it was our responsibility as a 
search and rescue as a fire and rescue service to take, what’s the expression? A calculated 
risk to save what we consider to be a saveable life” (F10). This suggested that although ‘save 
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life’ was an acknowledged strategic goal for agencies, the specific meaning of this “standard 
tag line” (A4) with regards to behaviour was not always clear.  
The ‘prevent harm’ goal. Action seemed to derail when commanders had to trade off 
‘saving lives’ with ‘preventing harm’: “but it had to be reasonable because you’ve got to 
bear in mind maximise safety of the officers as well as a strategy” (P8). ‘Prevent harm’ was 
coded as a defensive avoid goal and linked to the mental simulation of potential negative 
consequences that could arise should action go wrong: “I’ll be quite frank there’s no incident 
that you deal with that is easy. And the reason is because as part of your training you have to 
look at what the outcomes you want are – what are the desirable and what will you actually 
tolerate” (P12). This caused commanders to redundantly deliberate, as they sought to take 
action to ‘save life’, yet feared action could counterintuitively cause further harm: “at a 
minimum don’t make it worse and as best case scenario you actually make it better” (F10).  
Anticipated short- and long-term negative consequences. Negative consequences 
were linked to both short- and long-term outcomes (Figure 2). Short-term (i.e., incident 
related) negative consequences were themed into three potential outcomes: (i) harm to 
emergency responders: “that was what was the risk to us and taking into its worst case 
scenario you know we could come under fire, our team could come under fire” (A1); (ii) 
harm or injury to citizens inside the risk area: “I would prefer to be cautious and not risk any 
further injury by bringing him out in a way which I know to be a lot safer” (F2); and (iii) 
disruption to normality: “I think the danger was if we started saying the national front were 
coming then the local community might start rallying themselves to escalate as well” (P1).  
Commanders also feared negative consequences in the long-term. These were associated 
with (i) personal consequences; (ii) team consequences; and (iii) organisational 
consequences. Anticipated personal consequences included anxiety relating to personal pride: 
“that does kind of go through your mind. Am I going to be professionally embarrassed by 
this?” (P11); criticism from colleagues: “You know you’ve got the gold commander looking 
down on you, you’ve got your bronze commander and your PSU commanders and all the 
staff looking up” (P3); the potential for personal legal fallout: “one decision by a police 
office can have years of people unpicking it in the clinical warm surroundings of an officer 
where everyone can study well why did you do this? Well what about this, what about that?” 
(P4), and personal accountability as a commander: “I think that’s the biggest worry because 
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you can oh well I’ve done this loads of times but then that one time something goes wrong” 
(A3).  
Negative team consequences were associated with the legacy of inter-agency 
relationships: “I think you’ve got to maintain relationships with people in the future and I just 
think that there’ll be other times when we will work together in a similar environment” (P7); 
intra-agency relationship: “it depends on being prepared to compromise your friendship to 
make sure the job gets done. So you know I think you’ve got to be honest if you’re going to be 
a commander you’ve got to be prepared to be unpopular – it goes with the territory really” 
(P11); and the welfare of team members: “It feels really mean as well going back to someone 
who’s had a really shit few hours dealing with something like that which is pretty traumatic 
and then saying you need to do this and you need to do that” (A4).  
Organisational consequences included anxiety about public perception: “we had to have 
a real sort of grown up conversation about not leaving the scene because how would that 
look? To the public” (F1); the reputation of organisation: “It was getting away from us and 
there was a reputational issue there around we effectively made world-wide news” (F13); 
relationships with the local community: “I’m in a no win situation because the local 
community are just constantly why are you letting this happen? Why are you letting this 
happen?” (P1); and financial consequences for the organisation: “I recall it being 6 o clock 
and in my mind the big issue then was overtime because I had all these assets in that were 
changing shifts at 6 o clock and there was a massive overtime bill to consider but you put 
that to the back of your mind because you can’t really change your tactical plan based on the 
fact that you’re paying overtime” (F3).  
Fundamentally, commanders struggled to make a choice when they anticipated potential 
negative consequences for action: “I think sometimes we delay, we delay decisions because 
we are always all the time clouded by some of the consequences, which are not really about 
public safety as such, but about other things you know about what happens if it goes wrong?” 
(P10); but also for inaction: “you’ve got to go well we’ve got to get into this building because 
you know if we don’t do this then the consequences are greater” (F1). Commanders seemed 
to redundantly deliberate about the best timing for action, anticipating whether action or 
inaction would lead to ‘least-worst’ consequences at that point in time: “what you have to 
avoid is delaying making your decision about anything which then leads to somebody getting 
hurt, but by the same token you don’t want to kneejerk and rush into a decision that is not 
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properly considered” (P10). The anticipation of negative consequences derailed decision 
making as commanders were unable to judge the right time to take action in a context 
whereby the consequences for action were irreversible: “you’re at the point of no return. You 
can’t then claw that back. You can’t raise it – you’ve reached the ultimate now so that’s it. 
You can’t go back on that” (P4).  
Overcoming decision inertia: the importance of experiential learning. Although 
respondents described these challenges to commanding, they also seemed to draw strength 
their ‘responsibility as a commander’: “had I not taken that action at that time then you’d 
have had thousands and thousands of litres of ammonia leaked out into the surrounding area 
and the impact would’ve been devastating” (F8). This was further associated with confidence 
in one’s professional integrity: “you must look at what we do and why we do it and that’s to 
save life so it’s putting a provision in” (F9). It is possible that these feelings of responsibility 
might be associated with expertise and confidence, enabling commanders to acknowledge 
challenges, yet overcome them: “I’ve never been to an incident where I felt I’ve had enough 
information to do anything. There is never a situation where there’s absolutely no risk ever 
really, so wouldn’t you just, you’ve got to have, you’ve got to trust your own judgement I 
think really and a lot of that is about experience and a degree of self-preservation I suppose 
as well that you’re not going to be reckless” (P11).  
Discussion 
There were two core research questions that we sought to answer by interviewing 
experienced commanders from the emergency services. In response to RQ1, a thematic 
analysis identified nine core challenges to incident command, which were themed into two 
overarching categories of uncertainty (Alison et al., 2015). Five endogenous challenges 
emerged, associated with: (i) information problems (ii) resource limitations; (iii) time 
management issues; (iv) social management issues; and (v) budget cuts. Four exogenous 
(team) challenges associated with: (i) communication; (ii) role understanding; (iii) trust; and 
(iv) competition. In response to RQ2, grounded theory analyses suggested that challenges 
were associated with redundant deliberation about the potential negative consequences that 
might arise both whether they decided to act or not. Commanders were motivated to ‘attack’ 
the situation by taking positive (‘save life’) action, but also motivated to ‘defend’ the 
situation to ‘prevent harm’, which induced a cognitive trade-off between risk-seeking and 
risk-averse goals. Decision inertia occurred as a result of redundant deliberation about 
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potential negative consequences. Prospective short-term consequences were associated with 
the incident and linked to: (i) harm to emergency responders; (ii) harm to citizens inside the 
risk area; and (iii) further disruption to normality. Long-term negative consequences were 
linked to: (i) personal consequences; (ii) team consequences; and (iii) organisational 
consequences. However, although commanders acknowledged these difficulties, they drew 
strength from their feelings of ‘responsibility as a commander’, which gave them confidence 
overcome inertia. This discussion will firstly describe how thematic challenges fit with the 
psychological literature and their implications for research. We will then discuss the 
theoretical and practical implications of how these challenges seemed to influence behaviour, 
with reference to: (i) ‘attack’ and ‘defend’ goal trade-offs; and (ii) the anticipation of short- 
and long-term negative consequences. 
Challenges to emergency responding 
Endogenous challenges. Challenges were associated with both the characteristics of the 
emergency incident (endogenous) and to management and team processing (exogenous) 
(Alison et al., 2015). Many of the perceived endogenous challenges supported previous 
literature on decision making. For example, commanders acknowledged that both too little 
and too much information derailed choice, supporting research that an ‘obsession with full 
information’ is an ‘avoidable pathology’ that degrades emergency responding (Boin & t’Hart, 
2010). Resource challenges and time pressure also impeded decision making, which have 
both been previously associated with poor coordination in emergency management teams 
(Chen et al., 2008). Time pressure remains a relatively under-explored topic in disaster 
management (Janssen et al., 2010) with contradictory findings. Not only did increased time 
pressure inhibit the ability to make choices by increasing stress and cognitive load, but a lack 
of time pressure has also been found to impede decision making by increasing redundant 
information seeking (Alison, et al., 2015). These contradictory findings are intriguing, 
suggesting that both too much and too little time pressure degrades decision making. It would 
be useful to explore how much time pressure is needed to optimise action, as research on 
general time pressure has identified a U-shaped effect, facilitating performance up to a point 
before degrading action when levels get too high (Baer & Oldham, 2006). 
Two of the perceived endogenous challenges reflected contemporary issues for 
emergency responding: (i) ‘people management issues’; and (ii) ‘budget cuts’. Commanders 
described how it was increasingly difficult to manage the public during emergencies, as they 
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were pressurised by ‘the gaze of the public’ trying to ‘film it on their smartphones’ to upload 
to ‘youtube’. Although social media can facilitate dialogue between the emergency services 
and the public (e.g. location of public rest centres) (Houston, Hawthorne, Perreault, et al., 
2015), it must be used carefully. During a simulated bioterrorism incident, social media 
messages from the authorities increased public perceptions of risk, leading to greater 
frustration with the emergency services (Malet & Korbitz, 2015). Another contemporary 
challenge was the impact of budget cuts on responding. During data collection for this study, 
the UK government implemented unprecedented budget cuts across the blue lights services 
(McCartney, 2015). By the end of Parliament in May 2015, the average cut to each Fire and 
Rescue authority in the UK was 28%, with a further 10% of cuts planned in 2015/16 
(Hammond & Taylor, 2014). The Ambulance Service received a 19% cut in funding and the 
closure of five A&E departments in London (McCartney, 2015). Between 2011-2015, the 
Police had a 23% cut in funding across forces, leading to a total loss of 17,000 front line 
police officers (ACPO, 2015).  
Cuts seemed to exacerbate other endogenous challenges as commanders felt pressure to, 
for example, free up limited resources, limit financial expenditure and reduce the time spent 
at incidents. Commanders were anxious about the future of the emergency services and were 
concerned about team morale, especially when dealing with emotional incidents where team 
members were overworked with little capacity for effective debriefing. This is despite 
evidence that ‘critical incident debriefs’ following emotionally challenging events are 
extremely important for future working effectiveness (Theophilos, Magyar & Babl, 2009), 
especially for psychological and emotional issues (Ireland, Gilchrist & Maconochie, 2007). 
Budget cuts have reduced the opportunity to perform debriefs, yet increased their need due to 
associated stress. Further research to investigate the psychological impact of budget cuts on 
the decision making and emotional wellbeing of the emergency services is needed.  
Exogenous challenges. An exogenous challenge linked to team processing was poor 
communication between team members. There is a high risk of miscommunication during 
emergency incidents due to the use of specialist terminology and agency-specific acronyms, 
which can cause confusion at both intra- and inter-team levels (Bharosa et al., 2010; Laakso, 
2013). Relatedly, multi-team coordination was complicated by a poor understanding of one 
another’s’ roles and responsibilities (Weller, Janssen, Merry & Robinson, 2008) and 
competition between team members. Commanders described how other agencies were often 
unaware of their role-related capabilities, which has been found to diminish capacity for 
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lateral thinking during novel and unanticipated tasks (Curnin et al., 2015). Effective multi-
team environments are characterised by coordination between team members to transform 
intra-agency goals into collaborative inter-team action (Marks, Mathieu & Zaccaro, 2001; 
Mathieu, et al., 2000; Millward, Banks & Riga, 2010). Multi-team coordination must 
therefore be underpinned by a clear understanding of roles and objectives in order to avoid 
hyper-competition and facilitate teamwork. In an attempt to address these issues related to 
inter-agency working, the UK’s ‘Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme’ has 
provided guidelines to improve multi-team work by, for example, encouraging the use of 
‘plain English’ when working with other agencies (JESIP, 2013; 2016). This is a positive 
move that might facilitate multi-team coordination, albeit evidence to evaluate the 
effectiveness of such interventions is needed.  
Poor trust also emerged as an exogenous challenge. Trust is defined as a willingness to 
be vulnerable to advice that is provided by others (Mayer, Davis & Shoorman, 1995) and can 
expedite decision making in high-risk settings (Das & Tend, 2004). McAllister (1995) 
distinguished between two types of trust: ‘cognitive trust’; which describes faith in another’s 
abilities to complete a task, and ‘affective trust’; the emotional faith one holds in another. 
Trust is related to, but distinct from, confidence, which describes one’s certainty that events 
will occur as expected based on previous experience or evidence (Earle & Siegrist, 2006). 
Emergencies often involve temporary teams who are unfamiliar to each other but brought 
together in response to an incident. Such teams rely on ‘swift trust’, which is derived from a 
clear understanding of roles (Curnin et al., 2015; Meyerson, Weick & Kramer, 1996). Taken 
together, a clarification of role-related capabilities in emergency teams could enhance 
cognitive trust and lead to greater confidence, independent of interpersonal experience (i.e., 
affective trust).  
Interestingly, distrust in team members (i.e., belief that another cannot be relied upon) 
did not seem to derail choice in this study. Distrust might be linked to poor confidence as 
commanders identified another’s lack of skills based upon past experience with the individual 
or assumed competencies of their rank/role, and adapted their decision making in accordance 
to this (e.g. they asked someone else). Instead, difficulties arose from trust uncertainty, when 
commanders were unsure about whether they could rely on another. A better understanding 
of roles, both within and between agencies, can reduce uncertainty by providing greater 
confidence in the capabilities of others (Meyerson et al., 1996). A unique finding of this 
paper was coded as a ‘trust paradox’. Commanders described how high levels of emotional 
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trust in other team members made decision making more challenging when opinions differed. 
Indeed, highly trusting organisations were found to perform worse due to organisational 
rigidity and inertia (Thorgren & Wincent, 2011). Further research to explore how different 
types of trust interact with decision making in high-risk, multi-team organisational 
environments would be useful. 
 Implications and recommendations from RQ1. This paper has provided a visual 
model of the core challenges to emergency responding as identified by expert practitioners. It 
extends beyond previous research, which identified endogenous challenges following 
simulated exercises (e.g. Chen et al., 2008; Salmon et al., 2011), by collecting data from in-
depth retrospective interviews with commanders. This allowed for the inclusion of exogenous 
challenges linked to real-world and (inter)personal issues, which are difficult to replicate in 
simulated environments due to the absence of any real-life, long-term implications for 
behaviour. Alison et al. (2015) suggested that interventions to reduce ‘exogenous’ challenges 
can indirectly reduce ‘endogenous’ challenges. For example, a fluid and well managed team 
would respond to a complex situation more effectively than a poorly managed team. We 
suggest that practitioners should use the visual model from this study to guide training to 
reduce challenges (e.g. training to enhance greater multi-team role understanding). From a 
research perspective, it would be useful to explore the differences between perceived 
uncontrollable endogenous characteristics (e.g. trust issues) and systematic uncontrollable 
endogenous characteristics (e.g. budget cuts). It is possible that training might have a greater 
positive effect on perceived challenges than systematic challenges that are beyond the control 
of the individual. This would help to provide clarity between challenges that can be mitigated 
by skills and expertise, and those that need addressing from a policy or procedural angle. The 
identified challenges also provide a basis for further research to explore theoretical questions. 
For example, research to explore the contradictory effects of ‘time pressure’ in emergency 
contexts, the identification of a ‘trust paradox’ in organisational settings, and the impact that 
budget cuts can have with regards to decision making and team welfare. Thus, the 
identification of these challenges does not only inform RQ2, but offers a platform upon 
which to build future training and research. 
How challenges influence decision making and behaviour: the anticipation of negative 
consequences for action and inaction 
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 Not only has this paper identified challenges associated to emergency responding, but it 
has also described how challenges seemed to derail decision making. Decision inertia was 
underpinned by the anticipation of negative consequences related to goal violation. For 
example, should I take action to ‘save life’ even if it might risk harm to emergency responder 
safety, or should I delay action in order to ‘prevent harm’ to responders even if it might risk 
saving life? Anticipating the consequences for behaviour can be useful to ensure that 
behaviour isn’t reckless or too risky. The recognition primed decision (RPD) model (Klein, 
Calderwood & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986) describes how experts are able to quickly recognise 
critical cues in the environment, which activate analogues of previously experienced 
situations, enabling experts to quickly make appropriate decisions by recognising the 
appropriate course of action. It is possible that the recognition of challenge-related cues could 
be adaptive in crisis environments; experts have learnt from their past mistakes and so the 
recognition of challenges might help them to make better decisions (e.g. “I know the public 
might criticise this behaviour and so I will discount it and generate another solution”). 
However, commanders struggled when they were unable to move beyond cue recognition and 
focused on negative consequences instead. Rather than reacting to cues intuitively, they 
consciously deliberated about potential negative consequences, inducing decision inertia.  
Goal-directed anticipatory thinking: Attack versus defend goals. Commanders were 
driven by two goals: (i) to ‘save life’ and (ii) ‘prevent harm’. As identified in previous 
research in emergency contexts (Power & Alison, in press), these align to the approach-avoid 
distinction for goal-directed behaviour (Bossuyt et al., 2014; Elliot, 2006). Generally, avoid 
goals are considered to be less adaptive than approach goals (Bossuyt et al., 2014; Elliot, 
2006). Avoid goals reflect the desire to avoid failure and are associated to negative affect, 
anxiety and depleted self-regulatory resources (Oertig, Schuler, Brandstatter, Rosekes & 
Elliot, 2013). For example, the anticipation of and desire to avoid negative emotions, such as 
regret, degrades decision making as individuals focus on how to avoid regret rather than how 
to make a rational choice (Mourali, Pons & Hassay, 2011). Although not explored in this 
study, redundant deliberation over a problem could contribute to mental fatigue and tiredness, 
which have been found to degrade performance in police settings (James & Vila, 2015) and 
increase regret in clinical decision settings (Scott, Arslanian-Engoren & Engoren, 2014). 
Future research to identify how goal focus and deliberation interacts with mental fatigue and 
decision outcomes would be interesting.  
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Omission bias describes how individuals irrationally perceive harm by commission 
(action) to be worse than harm by omission (not taking action) because they feel more 
personally responsible for the negative consequences of behaviour than they do for non-
behaviour (Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002; Ritov & Baron, 1995). Omission bias has been found 
to increase in high risk settings (Bartels & Baron, 2007). Interestingly, our study found that 
commanders were not only worried about the negative consequences for taking action, but 
were also concerned about the negative consequences that might arise if they failed to act. 
They were worried about harm that could arise both from action and inaction. This unusual 
finding could be linked to the context of the research, as commanders had an organisational 
responsibility to act. This context might prime a commission bias; a biased preference for 
individuals to act because they feel responsible for the potential negative consequences of 
inaction. Commanders rarely have the luxury to ‘do nothing’ as their core responsibility is to 
resolve the emergency incident. Omission bias is the result of anticipated blame or regret for 
poor outcomes of behaviour (Kordes-de Vaal, 1996). In situations where the individual is 
responsible for taking action to prevent negative outcomes, anxiety may be equally associated 
with anticipated blame or regret for poor outcomes linked to inaction. Future research to 
explore the concept of commission biased processing in other organisational settings is 
encouraged. 
Anticipating negative consequences: Short- versus long-term outcomes. A unique 
contribution of this research was the use of retrospective interviewing to explore real-world 
pressures on decision making. This meant that commanders not only considered incident-
related (i.e., short-term) outcomes for decision making, but also discussed the anticipation of 
negative real-world consequences that could outlast the incident (i.e., long-term). In 
analysing these more closely, it seemed that short-term consequences were concrete and 
related to the incident (e.g. harm to citizens), whereas long-term consequences were vague 
and related with poor (inter)personal outcomes for oneself, one’s team and one’s 
organisation. This aligns with construal level theory, which suggests that people make 
different judgements about the world depending upon their perceived psychological distance 
to stimuli (Liberman & Trope, 1998). When people think about events (or outcomes) in the 
future, they tend to consider them in more abstract ways and focus on what they desire 
outcomes to be; whereas temporally nearby events are processed in more concrete ways and 
individuals focus on the feasibility of outcomes (Lutchyn & Yzer, 2011; Trope & Lieberman, 
2003). In linking this to our findings, it is possible that short-term negative outcomes (i.e., 
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harm to citizens, harm to responders, disruption to normality) were considered as feasible 
outcomes that commanders hoped to avoid; whereas long-term negative outcomes (i.e., 
criticism of oneself, one’s team, or one’s organisation) were considered in more abstract and 
desirable ways. It would be interesting to manipulate one’s focus on these different temporal 
outcomes (i.e., short v long-term) to see whether it changes the way an individual processes 
their choice. For example, does the consideration of long-term outcomes (e.g. negative 
accountability) lead to greater redundant deliberation in order to achieve more desirable 
outcomes, compared to short-term outcomes, which might lead to more task-focussed 
processing on how to feasibly overcome obstacles? 
Temporal focus has been found to vary between individuals; some people chronically 
focus on immediate outcomes compared to others who focus on distant outcomes (Stathman, 
Gleicher, Boninger & Edwards, 1994). For example, future focussed individuals tend to 
strive towards the achievement of future goals and rewards; whereas present focussed 
individuals can be present-hedonistic (i.e., risk-takers who focus on pleasure) or present-
fatalistic (i.e., helpless individuals who feel powerless) (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). It would 
be interesting to identify whether an individuals’ temporal focus predicts their tendency to 
anticipate short- or long-term outcomes, and how that interacts with behaviour. It has also 
been suggested that dispositional temporal processing is context specific. It was found that 
general dispositional measures on the ‘consideration of future consequences scale’ were 
unrelated to healthy eating behaviour, whereas those a food-specific future orientation was 
associated with healthier eating behaviour (Dassen, Houben & Jansen, 2015). What is unique 
about our findings with regards to temporal processing is that commanders tended to consider 
both short- and long-term negative consequences. Future research could unpack these 
findings in three ways: firstly, to identify whether individual differences in general temporal 
orientation influences decision making; secondly, to identify whether individual differences 
in emergency-context specific temporal thinking influences decision making; and thirdly, to 
explore whether temporal priming (i.e., focus on short- or long-term consequences before 
responding) interacts with decision making; specifically the time it takes to make a choice 
and decision inertia. 
Implications and Recommendations from RQ2. Qualitative analyses suggested that 
commanders struggled to make decisions due to negative anticipatory thinking. Unlike 
previous research, which suggested that individuals have a tendency to avoid action when 
faced with high-risk choices (Bartels & Baron, 2007; Ritov & Baron, 1999), commanders 
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described an organisational responsibility to take action despite high risk. However, due to 
the complexity of the emergency incident, they anticipated negative outcomes both for action 
and inaction, thereby redundantly deliberating over their choice. Negative outcomes were not 
only anticipated to arise during the incident but also in the long-term. This is an important 
contribution of this research, as the majority of research exploring emergency decision 
making has focused on incident-related (i.e., short-term) processing; this paper has extended 
knowledge to incorporate real-world long-term considerations relating to, for example, 
personal fallout from poor decision making. 
Positively, commanders described how they were able to overcome challenges by 
drawing strength from their experience of and responsibility to command. According to the 
RPD, experts would be able to use challenges as cues for recognition-primed solutions (Klein 
et al., 1986). Experienced decision makers have ‘adaptive expertise’, which allows them to 
recognise when standard procedures are no longer appropriate and so shift their behaviour 
(Mercier & Higgins, 2013). For example, experienced authorised firearms officers were 
found to show greater ‘adaptive flexibility’ in comparison to novices, which allowed them to 
be more reactive and flexible to situational changes compared to novices who relied heavily 
on linear thinking and standard operating procedures (Boulton & Cole, 2016). Expertise has 
also been found to have a psychophysiological basis as expert Police officers indicated 
different responses (e.g. lower heart rate) to novices during a simulated shooting task 
(Johnson, Stone, Miranda, Vila, James, James, Rubio & Berka, 2014). A greater 
understanding of how adaptive flexibility develops in experienced commanders would be 
useful in order to inform command-level training. Although we did not objectively test the 
role of experience on decision making, it is suggested that specific training on decision 
making skills, as opposed to technical skills, could enable commanders to develop greater 
adaptive flexibility. This might speed up the acquisition of decision skills and empower 
commanders to limit their negative prospective modelling. Training might include 
contextualised thought problems to expose commanders to challenging situations and 
develop confidence. Indeed, poor confidence in one’s abilities has been linked to 
‘amotivation’ and the use of maladaptive avoidant goals (Lee, Sheldon & Turban, 2003). 
Thus, early training for commanders on how to deal with difficult cognitive trade-offs could 
enable greater adaptability to these types of tasks, greater confidence in one’s skills to 
command and overall faster and more flexible reactions to complex emergencies. 
Limitations  
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There are a three main limitations to this study. Firstly, the sample of commanders who 
participated in this study were recruited opportunistically from the North West of England, 
meaning that some response agencies had fewer participants and that the sample was from 
one region of England. It would be useful to extend this study to other areas in the UK (and 
internationally) to see if findings are comparable, and to also explore a more balanced sample 
of practitioners across agencies. It would also be interesting to compare different levels of 
experience; a more systematic sampling procedure would be useful to compare perspectives 
between operational, tactical and strategic levels. Secondly, although we were interested in 
exploring decision delays and inertia, we did not explicitly ask participants how long they 
delayed their choices as a means of comparison. It would be interesting to unpack this in 
more controlled simulation settings to see how different types of endogenous or exogenous 
challenges interact with decision speed. Thirdly, there are limitations with the purely 
qualitative approach of this study as its conclusions are arguably less scientific than those 
derived from more stringent quantitative research (Crandall, et al., 2006; Laubschagne, 
2003). Different researchers can generate different conclusions about the same data set 
depending upon their ability, experience and research focus, which suggests subjectivity and 
bias in analyses (Glӓser & Laudel, 2009). However, as we sought to explore the challenges to 
decision making as perceived by experienced commanders, rather than test hypotheses, 
qualitative methods were appropriate as traditional quantified techniques tend to reduce 
behaviour and cognitive processing to numerical values that can strip the data of its meaning 
(Bogner & Menz, 2002). As such, we avoided the quantification of challenges (e.g. 
percentage values of how many commanders identified each theme) because this would have 
been misleading due to the flexible interviewing style that we adopted. Thus, the results from 
this exploratory study can be used to guide subsequent context-rich (i.e., emergency response 
settings) and context-general (i.e., decision making in high-risk organisational settings) 
research to better understand how individuals process challenges and make decisions in 
complex choice environments.  
 
Conclusion 
Endogenous challenges in emergency contexts related to issues with: (i) information; 
(ii) resources; (iii) time pressure; (iv) people management; and (v) adapting to and coping 
with budget cuts and austerity; and exogenous challenges related to issues with: (i) 
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communications; (ii) role understanding; (iii) trust; and (iv) competitiveness. Practitioners 
can use these categories to inform targeted training sessions, and researchers can use them to 
guide future psychological research on decision making in high-stakes, multi-team 
environments. Commanders discussed how challenges interacted with decision processing, 
leading to decision inertia. Decision inertia was driven by prospective modelling of the 
potential short- and long-term negative consequences that might arise from both action and 
inaction. Commanders sought to ‘save life’ and ‘prevent harm’, but the inherent high-risk of 
the emergency made the achievement of both of these goals difficult. However, although goal 
conflict was identified by commanders as being challenging, they described how their 
feelings of responsibility as a commander helped to galvanise action. We recommend that 
future research should explore whether training that specifically focusses on the development 
of decision making skills and flexible cognitive processing would help to facilitate greater 
decisiveness on the incident ground. 
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Table 1: Deepening probes used during CDM interviews 
DEEPENING PROBES 
INSTRUCTIONS: Now I want to go through the incident again but this time we want to look at it in a little 
bit more detail. I’m going to guide you with some questions. 
PROBE TOPIC PROBE 
Basis of choice Why did you select/reject this course of action? 
 What did you believe the consequences of your choice may be? 
 What were these beliefs based upon? 
 How did you feel when making this decision? 
Were you following any standard rules or operating procedures? 
 Had you been trained to deal with this type of event? 
 What specific training or experience helped you make this choice? 
 Were you reminded of any previous experiences? 
Did you consider any other courses of action? 
Goals What were your specific goals or objectives? 
What was the most important priority for you at this point in time? 
Information and Cues How did you know that you needed to make the decision?  
 How did you know when to make the decision? 
What information did you use in making your decision? 
 What were you looking at? 
What did you do with the information you had? 
 Did you use all the information you had available to you? 
 What was the most important piece of information you used? 
Where did you get this information?  
 Did you seek guidance from someone else at this point? 
 How did you know to trust the information? 
Was there any additional information that you would have liked? 
Influence of 
uncertainty 
Were you uncertain about either the reliability or the relevance of the information 
that you had available? 
Decision barriers In your opinion what were the biggest barriers to your decision making on that 
day? 
Were there any organisational or social barriers which made your decision more 
difficult? 
 Within your own organisation? 
 From external organisations? 
Did complexity or uncertainty in the decision making environment make your 
decision making difficult? 
 At any point did you find it difficult to process the information you had? 
 Were you uncertain about the appropriateness of your decision? 
Were you expecting to have to make this type of decision during the incident? 







 How long did it take to reach the decision? 
 Did you feel time pressured at all? 
Decision strategy Did you try and avoid making this decision at any point? 
What types of actions did you take to try and make this decision? 
 Do you think that you could develop any rules which could assist another 
person to make this decision successfully? 
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Information Lack of information “the lack of information was quite – because well how many patients?” (A4) 
“It’s difficult to make command decisions remotely. I mean police are better at it because 
they will use verbal reports or effective use of CCTV or other visual images” (F7) 
Too much information “you’re getting information from the police, you’re getting information from the local 
authority from the people, the company… So it’s a whole range of information – the key is to 
be able to sort out the bits that are relevant and then come up with a command structure so 
that you don’t get overwhelmed” (F10) 
Resources Lack of resources “lack of resources… you know if I’d have turned up there with our full turn out my decisions 
would’ve been different” (F5). 
Unreliable resources “the biggest complaint we have post-incident is communications… Not so much individuals 





“there was a constant flow and these decisions were coming thick and fast all the time. So 
talk about being under pressure. It was probably the most pressurised position that I have 
ever been in” (P4) 
“you could be like there 10 hours but it feels like 20 minutes because it’s just one decision 
after another” (A3) 
Administrative 
demands 
“every patient that you have you’re supposed to have a patient report form and that’s the 
only thing with a major incident is the audit trail is never as good as it could be because 
everyone gets ahhh” (A4) 
“I made copious notes on the log on my rationale so that people knew the best interests were 
at the hearts and there was a balance” (P8) 
People 
management  
Public inside risk area “thinking about it there was this thing of like how do we know how many people we’ve got? 
Because there’s one dead on the embankment and there were bits of fires going off 
everywhere you know and it’s like how do you know there’s not more people?” (A4) 
Public outside risk 
area 
 “when you’ve got lots of people in what becomes a confined space the fear that someone is 
going to get injured is fairly significant” (P10) 
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“it was a Friday afternoon, which is probably quite important in terms of some of the 
logistical difficulties” (P5) 
Social media/potential 
criticism 
“with the media and the public perception these days we are more accountable for 
everything that we do than ever before” (P4) 
“I accept that we shouldn’t really be worried about what press headlines read because that’s 
the least important …But you can see how those pressures around press and media finance 
and all the other things that come on and necessarily at the back of your head when you’re 
trying to make sort of decisions on what to do” (P10) 
Budget cuts and 
austerity 
Reduced capacity and 
increased demand 
“I guess because of austerity none of us have been immune from that. You know we’ve all 
been challenged by austerity” (F1) 
“massive implications around the availability of ambo and fire and obviously you’re aware 
that fire and ambo are reducing in their resources” (P6) 
 “so it’s about ‘where do you draw the line?’ And like whereas we’d always go the extra 
yard and I think in some cases we still do – but I think eventually you’ll go ‘well now that’s 
not, we’ve done our bit now and we’ll have to push it back” (F1) 
Emotional demands 
(Hopelessness, fear) 
“you’ve got the initial people there for the stages but don’t forget those people need to get a 
break at some point throughout the day and have got to get replaced by somebody else” 
(P12) 
“I don’t think austerity’s ended. I think we’re in this for another 4 years so you know I think 









Communication Insufficient updating “people get frustrated because they’re not finding out all the information” (A4) 
“I’m still relying on other people to give me information. I am not seeing all and doing all 
and – so that reliability sometimes it can put a bit of pressure on you” (F7) 
Miscommunication  “I just remember it sticks in my mind it was just the conflict of information… where’s that 
information coming from?” (F4) 
 “it taught us a lesson afterwards that people were making decisions or trying to make 
decisions who didn’t understand what was going on” (A1) 
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responding “but it was also delayed because we had contrary views. So he was thinking one thing and 




understanding of role 
 “well the police told us to wait but in reality the police don’t know what we’ve got and what 




 “I briefed the health protection agency that’s not for me to – I can contribute to the public 
safety message but it’s not for me as a fire and rescue service commander to release the 
public safety message. That’s their responsibility” (F7) 
“there’s a tendency from some commanders just to be led by the police” (A2) 
Trust Distrust abilities “they weren’t my firefighters so I didn’t know their skills and competencies” (F8) 
“I’d worked with him in the past but I got the impression that they didn’t have at the time 
when by that afternoon they didn’t have as much dynamism and get up and go and 
knowledge as what I thought they had initially” (P5) 
“there’s a difference between trusting an individual and the expectation that that person at 
that level will be able to do what I’m asking of them” (F15) 
Mistrust intention “he was untested in terms of does he know about health and safety? Does he know about 
crowd dynamics?” (P2) 
“I mean they’re very well trained professional people so you know we work well with them 
and I respect what they do and what they say but I don’t think – you know it’s your I’m the 
decision maker – it’s my head on the line” (P8) 
Trust paradox “because we got a good working relationship and because he knows what he’s talking about 
for me to give him an opposing view probably made it slightly more difficult for me because 
I’m having to think well hang on I trust his decisions” (P7) 
 “it depends on being prepared to compromise your friendship to make sure the job gets 
done. So you know I think you’ve got to be to be honest if you’re going to be a commander 
you’ve got to be prepared to be unpopular – it goes with the territory really” (P11) 
Competition Intra-agency 
command 
“they were ringing the control and trying to put pressure on the control manager to say right 
we’ll hand over to you and I was like no” (A4) 
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“you know there’s always a willingness from any probably blue light responder ambulance 
inclusive that it’s their natural instinct that when I see a patient to want to help that patient 
whereas in a lot of situations it’s not always the best thing for their own safety” (A2) 
“if you get away with it then great they’re heroes, if they don’t then they’re not coming 
home” (F11) 
Inter-agency primacy “sometimes whoever shouts the loudest gets their own way – in my experience” (F2) 
“there’s also conflict with the ambulance service about the best way to get people out of a 
vehicle: we think we know best and they think they know best. And it’s hard. It’s being going 
on for some time that one but we’re getting there” (F4) 
“they were being threatened by big cuts so I suppose if someone else another organisation 
can come and do what you’re doing it maybe justifies the cuts whereas if you say well I’m an 
expert in this and no one else can do this it protects you role and position and job 
ultimately” (F2) 
Personalities/egos “you can get a bit of a rub between personalities that command might break down as well” 
(P1) 
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Figure 2: Short- and long-term negative consequences for both ‘action’ and ‘inaction’ 
Short-term negative 
consequences 
Harm to emergency 
responders 
Harm to citizens 
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